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AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.'
BY THE LATE JUSTICE ALBERT

HERMANN

POST.

ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE, the most recent branch
of the science of law, so richly elaborated

research, has

to battle for its existence.

still

by every method

Wide

of

circles in the

world of juridical learning utterly ignore it, or assume a hostile
and at best sceptical attitude towards it. Neither the history of
law nor the philosophy of jurisprudence has accorded it scientific
recognition, and even the tenability of the principles upon which
it is based has been characterised as highly questionable.
It is universally true that every new departure in science at
first meets with opposition, and that it cannot aspire to recognition until

it is

in a position to present results that are incontrover-

Only by presenting such results can it acquire recognised
standing in the roll of the sciences, and only by the elaboration of

tible.

these results can

it

repel definitively the attacks directed against

But this process may be expedited by giving in the clearest
and most explicit terms possible a sketch of its underlying principles, and so in the present case, while ethnological jurisprudence
is still in the initial stages of its development, it will not be amiss,

it.

the interests of our study, to attempt a substantiation of its scishall, by so doing, at least throw obstaentific pretensions.

in

We

cles in the

way

of superficial criticism

from the traditional stand-

point.

Ethnological jurisprudence stands in marked contrast with the
tendencies that at present dominate the science of law. Its method
of

procedure
1

is

fundamentally inductive, and has for

Translated from the

German by Thomas

J.

McCormack

its

starting-
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point the customs and juraP concepts of
Its

method furthermore

all

the nations of the earth.

specifically comparative-ethnological;

is

that is to say, it is on the one hand socio-psychological and on the
other hand comparative in the sense that it proceeds by comparison even where the historical connexion between the facts of the
jural life
It is

lacking.

is

thus opposed to

Every philosophy

of jurisprudence which is essentially demethods.
2. Every system of jurisprudence founded upon the law of a
single nation or a single group of nations.
3. Every system of jurisprudence which is individuo-psycho1.

ductive in

its

logical in its origin.
4.

ciple

All investigations of historical jurisprudence

do not quit the ground

of historical

ment of the facts of jural life.
These innovations have given
peculiar impress, and

it is

which on prin

connexion

in the treat-

to ethnological jurisprudence its

this peculiarity that

demands

scientific

vindication.

The

first

point of view that presents

of the jural order is

For the domain of
emanate from

that

itself for

jural life

comprehends the action of the forces
and the law finds its most immedi-

individuals,

ate expression in the jural sense of the individual.

anew

the examination

unquestionably the individuo-psychological.

It is daily

born

human soul. Here it appears in the
form of passion and desire, so soon as a misdeed is committed,
and urges to vengeance and expiation. The written law of statutebooks and the courts, however, is but the mediate expression of
in

the depths of the

the jural

life.

The

first

point of view presenting

ing: to regard

all jural

itself is

therefore the follow-

order as the product of the differences and

coincidences of the jural sense of human individuals, and to endeavor to explain the same from the nature of man, that is, from
the nature of the individual.

This idea still rules supreme in modern jurisprudence. We
meet on all sides with arguments explanatory of state and law,
which are derived from the nature of the human individual. And
seeing that the individuo-psychological method of investigation
derives its materials directly from the living source of life, while
1 "By the adjeclive jural yfe shall denote that which has reference to the doctrine of rights
and obligations; as by the adjective "moral" we denote that which has reference to the doc-

trine of duties."

— Whewell.

(Quoted by Translator.)

i
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phenomena

of the life

of all nations, deriving thence its inductions as to the causes

underlie the same, certainly,

if it

adequately from the nature of the

were possible

human

which

to explain jural life

individual, the individuo-

psychological method would have the preference.

But

this latter

standing of jural

method does not lead far towards the underThe sequence of causes soon vanishes in so

life.

inaccessible a sphere as the personality of the individual, and true

by ingenuity and sophistry.
Viewed from the individuo-psychological standpoint, the facts
jural life are partly matter of our subjective and partly matter of

scientific inquiry is displaced

of

our objective experience.
Matter of subjective experience

is

merely our own individual

upon
and wrong. This individual jural sense is made up of a sumtotal of psychical activities, of which we become conscious when
from inward or outward excitation we are confronted with the question as to whether something is right or wrong.
These psychical
activities are partly feelings and desires, and partly judgments, the
former tending towards action and the latter tending towards expression by word or sign. Jural feelings are principally feelings of
indignation as when an injustice is experienced by an individual, a
feeling of fear as when the individual is affected by an inclination
to do wrong, a feeling of penitence as when the individual has committed a wrong. With the feeling of indignation is joined a desire
for vengeance, with the feeling of penitence a desire of atonement,
the former tending towards an act of vengeance and the latter
towards an act of expiation. The jural judgments of individuals
are not complete judgments; they are based upon an undefined
sense of right and wrong.
In the consciousness of the individual
there exists no standard of right and wrong under which every single circumstance giving rise to the formation of a jural judgment
can be subsumed. A simple instinct impels the individual to declare an action right or wrong.
It thus becomes evident that the individuo-psychological analysis of the individual jural sense, in so far as it rests upon subjective experience, can afford only meagre results.
All psychical
jural sense, that is our individual consciousness as bearing

right

phenomena

of the jural sense are, so far as regards our subjective

experience, ready-made products.
of jural emotions, desires,

inner experience.

The

The psychological development

and judgments,

is

not accessible to our

psychological processes whereby

we

be-
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come conscious

of jural emotions, desires, and judgments, lie
without the reach of consciousness.
Further, subjective observation of the psychical processes
from which the jural sense springs, bears the same character as
subjective observation of psychical processes generally.
Systemis
impossible,
inasmuch
as
the
observing
subatic self-observation
are
observed
object
one
and
the
same,
and
very
ject and the
the
act of observing thus modifies the object observed.^ It is likewise
impossible to evoke, arbitrarily or artificially, a jural desire or an
instinctive jural judgment; they always appear instantaneously

and unbidden

As material

in consciousness.

for observation, ac-

cordingly, there remains only the recollection of such occurrences
in the

mind

of the individual.

another drawback to the employment of subjective observation for scientific inquiry is the fact, that it is almost utterly impossible to distinguish in general between jural feelings, desires,
and judgments, and moral feelings, desires, and judgments.
Still

more favorable

inquiry attains

Scientific

results

when

it

adopts as the subject of investigation the expressions of the individual jural conscience in the external world of sense that is,
the phenomena of the individual jural sense as appearing in acts

—

on the one hand and in words and signs on the other. Here selfobservation discovers facts which are represented as events in the

outward world

of sense,

and which are consequently subject

to ex-

True, the observation of the outward expres-

ternal observation.

sions of the individual jural conscience in acts, words, and signs
affords scarcely

more material

for the psychological analysis of the

individual jural sense than the direct inward observation of the

same.

The

material for observation increases, however,

server, not confining himself to the expressions of his

if

the ob-

own

jural

compares with these the expressions of the jural sense of
other people, or even compares the expressions of the jural sense
sense,

of other people with

From

this

each other.

method

dissimilarities in the

phenomena

of the ju-

consciousness appear at once, and these are in a high degree
adapted to throw light upon its nature. In the first place it is posral

the jural sense of individuals

sible to distinguish differences in

It is possible to follow the jural sense
according to their ages.
are also able to fix degrees
of children in its development.

We

of jural sense in

13

youth and manhood, perhaps too

iComte, Positive Philosophy, abridged by Rig
Wundt, Loeih, 1883, II., p. 482.

ff.

;

German

in old age.

translation by Kirchmann, 1883,

I.

p.

ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.
It will

645

be possible, furthermore, to point out variations of jural

Then further, there
marked irregularities of jural sense resulting from
which derangement may rest on biological as well

sense between the male and female sexes.
are to be noted

derangement

j

Mental diseases, affecting the whole conBesides
these, there are a great number of persons whose jural sense,
though not disturbed by any psychical disarrangement, is far below the normal state namely, criminals. Such persons, endowed
with a jural sense of a socio-pathological kind, furnish the material for a separate branch of psychology; viz., criminal psycholMarked irregularities in the individual jural sense may be
ogy.
further distinguished according to the social circle in which the inEven in a single nation these irregularities are
dividual moves.
quite considerable according to caste, culture, occupation, poliYet the most considerable deviations
tics, religion, and the like.
are to be found between the jural consciences of different peoples,
and they are more considerable according as the difference in civilisation is greater, or as the development of the same has been
as sociological causes.

sciousness of the individual, affect the jural sense also.

;

;

more unique.
In

all

these ways

it

would be possible

to observe the expres-

sions of the individual jural sense and by a process of individuoIt is evipsychological comparison to arrive at scientific results.
dent, though, that it would be difficult to collect the material for

observation, and that the observations of individuals themselves to

end would be subject to innumerable sources of error.
These observations could not acquire scientific value unless
made upon the most extensive plan, and with persons of different

this

ages, different sex, different intellectual ability,

different social

standing, and different nationality; and unless the material accu-

mulated were so considerable that

all

the sources of error in indi-

vidual observation could be eliminated.

To

limit the observations

narrow field, would necessarily yield incorrect results for it
is now beyond question that the jural sense of individuals is subThe most distorted preject to the most varied differentiations.
sentation of all, however, is produced when the inquirer confines
himself mainly to his own individual jural sense, and persuades
He
himself that this should determine the conduct of humanity.
has here merely systematised his own jural consciousness; manito a

;

festly a doleful scientific result.

How is it possible to observe the manifestations of the individual jural sense, which appear only instinctively and occasion-
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ally,

exhaustively enough to obtain really valuable scientific matea causal analysis of the jural order?
It is unquestionably

rial for

hopeless.

And even were it possible to proceed thus, we should be far
from exhausting in this way the data of jural life. Jural life, as a
social province, is by no means made up of immediate expressions
of the individual jural sense only; there are also mediate and indisame

rect expressions of the

in

it.

The

with their statutes and provisions, have,

positive laws of nations
it is

true, their first origin

in the expressions of the jural sense of individuals.

But

after these

have become positive laws they are no longer the immediate expressions of the individual jural sense, but the objective products
of the jural sense of whole spheres of social development, of countless individuals with variously formed jural consciences
individuals of existing generations as well as individuals that have long
passed away.
It would be a manifestly precarious attempt to seek the expla-

—

nation of these
itself.

phenomena

in the nature of the

Unlimited scope would be given

human

to caprice

individual

and imagina-

tion.

And yet, in the face of all, this method of studying the Science
Jurisprudence is still greatly in vogue, and meets with unqualified approval from contemporary students. They endow the human
individual with certain instincts, the social instinct and the inof

stinct of self-preservation

ends according to

its

:

or they will

have

it

pursue different

constitutional bent, happiness, liberty, etc.,

and upon these phantasms they build

becomes
These
artistic productions are often charming reading, often teem with
clever conceits, and give us a pretty picture of how blissful all
would be, were it not so different in the world. If these works did
not claim to be more than light and entertaining reading, we might
joyfully welcome them.
But they pretend to be more; they assert
that they are scientific, and would actually influence the practical
mechanism of the jural order. Herein is their danger. Ethnological Jurisprudence, in my opinion, must stand aloof from all attempts to define State and Law on the basis of individual psychology.
And now to the discussion and proof.
their structure as

the kindly heart and academic culture of the philosopher.

*
It is

tempts

*

*

we find atphenomena of social life on the basis of
psychology. This method is common to all the other so-

not only in the province of Jurisprudence that

to explain the

individual

ETHNOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE.
cial sciences.

gical principle,

and

will

It

rests

which

upon

and fundamental psycholoday shows signs of instability

a broad

at the present

sooner or later be completely overthrown.

human science
whether we assume that
All

takes on a different form,

man

but that

In the

is

according to

man can be determined from
and ego of man are not identical

the nature of

his ego alone, or that the soul

tivity.
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conscious of a portion only of his psychical acinstance, the psychology of the individual is

first

human

we have to
Ethnology, and likewise
ethnological jurisprudence, is founded upon the second view.
It
assumes that, in the individual consciousness, only a small portion
of his psychical activity is manifest to the individual and that the
the irreversible basis of

science

;

in the second,

look about us for broader foundations.

greater part is lost to his consciousness.
It regards individual
psychology, therefore, as no proper basis of science.
That which we call our consciousness is in any case but an infinitesimally small portion of the totality of psychic life active
It hovers like a tenuous and shimmering cloud above an
unfathomable ocean. All manner of images rise from the depths
of our soul, yet few assume such sharpness of contour as to be recBy far the greater portion of our spiritual life remains
ognised.

within us.

unknown
which we

to us.

By

far the greatest portion of the spiritual life of

is known to us only as the resultant product
unconscious psychical processes, and not as something in process
of production.
We remain totally unconscious of those spiritual
activities which touch most nearly the vital centre of our being, the
activities which create on the one side an ego and on the other a
world.
At the instant a child first becomes conscious of itself, the
their birth is concomitant
ego and the world are already existent
with the act of consciousness.
The unconscious activities of the
soul have shaped them, until, appearing as ready-formed pro-

are conscious,

of

:

which man beand a world. We remain utterly unconscious, too, of those psychical workings which give to the
world its sensible character and to the ego its spiritual. Our world,
in every phase in which it is accessible to us, is virtually a products, they give rise to that radical contrariety by

comes conscious

of himself

Light,
duct of psychical activities acting unconsciously within us.
heat, color, sound, taste, smell, pressure, weight, even space and
on the contrary they
time, do not belong to the world as such
are creations of mental activities, corresponding to the psychological activities of our sensory and central organs, and project
:

without a world created within.
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Rokitansky^ expresses himself upon this subject as follows
"We see the world that surrounds us by means of light but
now known that light does not exist as such apart from us
:

;

it is

;

on the contrary it is vibrations of ether, which we transpose into
light, and recognise as such, by means of mechanisms of specific
Thus we
irritability located beyond the sensory organs proper.
things
therein
and
come
to
know
ourselves illuminate space
through their relation to light we acquire knowledge not only as
to their surface and outlines, but also as to their inner constituIt is likewise the vibrations of sounding bodies of different
tion.
magnitude and velocity, taken up and communicated to us by the
And so, too, the things
air, that we convert into sound and tone.
which we perceive through impressions upon the other senses,
are, apart from our conception of them, quite different, and undoubtedly consist of the molecular or molar motions of matter. It
must strike every impartial person as strange that we recognise as
external objects things of which the conception is really formed
How does this come? There is undoubtedly a subjecwithin us.
;

tive organic activity present here.

" This much is known that the impelling power in obedience
to which we project objects conceived, outside the subject conceiving them, must lie in the inward organisation of the mind that
:

;

the conception of things in space

is

a function of the organs of our

cognitive faculty which even in dreams creates in our imagination

an external world.

"The

perceptible world about us

by the functioning

is

essentially a creation of our

organs that objects
appear as things outside of us, as things of definite quality and
Further, when we behold in
form, of definite size and greatness.
the genesis of things and in their different stages and mutations a
succession and a connexion, we say that the succession takes place
in time and that the connexion between the changes is a causal one.

personality;

it

is

of inner

But when we ask ourselves how we arrive at these conclusions, it
we do so by virtue of subjective forms which must
lie in our organisation and by means of which we are in fact enabled to apprehend successions and connexions."
Even the world that remains after we remove the mantle of
sensible phenomena, the world of ether and matter vibrations, is
turns out that

still

man

not the world proper

;

it is

the world only as

cognitive activity.

\Der selbst. IVerih des Wissens,

1869, p.

6,

et seq.

it

appears to hu-
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The psychical operations, too, that create our ego are totally
hidden from us.
And even the greater part of those psychical operations of
which we are conscious, are presented to consciousness as finished
products, the genesis of which took place in unconsciousness. Ratiocination alone is effected wholly in consciousness. Feelings and
desires

come

consciousness as results only, and

to

many judgments

are not logical judgments, but incompleted ones, lying, with the

principle

upon which they were formed,

province of the un-

in the

conscious.

be correct, it is evident that our consciousness is in
thorough comprehension of human nature
for only an insignificant portion of our spiritual life ever becomes
immediately conscious. What we are able to fathom by self-conIf

no wise

all this

fitted for the

templation

;

soon exhausted.

is

Yet unlimited

is

the province of

knowledge that opens before us, if to the inward observation of
self we add outward observation by the senses
in other words, if,
from the phenomena of unconscious psychic life as expressed in
the outward world of sense, we draw inferences as to the unconscious activities at work within us.
To this end the whole sensible world presents itself. Our sen;

sible

world

is

not the real world-in-itself.

It

is

merely a world-

made by man, created by human psychical activities. From
this, therefore, we shall be able to gather a great part of our unconscious psychical life, and thus come infinitely nearer the esimage,

sence of our being than would be possible through the introspective observation of

way we

our

own

psychical activities.

psychology of the past, which
attempted to unfold the nature of man from the ego, but at a psychology which will endeavor to disclose the same from the worldimage created by man.
In this

arrive, not at the

*

*

Among

phenomena

the

*
of

our sensible world which admit of

inferences as to unconscious psychical activities, the
of social life

And
als,

assume

social

supposably

life,

prominent place.
though made up of the

phenomena

a

in possession of free will,

upon the more or
Whosoever has had

activities of individuis

also essentially in-

unconscious impulses of
the individual.
to do with the more intricate
problems of ethnology, will entertain no doubt whatever of this
stinctive, resting

less

fact.

Turn where we

will in the

domain

of social life,

we

shall every-
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where see fixed social laws at work, everywhere meet with a tendency of development, which leading through centuries and centuries, makes towards some definite end, and of whose aims the
Conindividuals comprehended in the movement have no idea.
template the history of the growth of language, the development
of

forms of divinity, of art, of legal institutions, even of fashions
they come, grow, and go, like things of life. There
;
but little here that is the product of individual reflexion ; almost

and utensils
is

everything

is of

organic growth.

The

individual follows blind im-

pulses and coercive social conditions

;

the individual most fre-

quently intends the very opposite of what he produces by his work,
and all that he does accomplish, unless fitting in with the course of

come

organic development, will soon

That the individual
stinctively,

we may

to

naught.

in social life acts for the

ascertain by

vation of other individuals.

A

self-

most part

in-

observation and by the obser-

man,

in

speaking

to another,

em-

ploys the words he needs quite instinctively; they come to him, as
He need not know anything of
a rule, without further reflexion.
the grammar of the language he speaks, and yet may employ the
language with the greatest ease. A man who is confronted with
the question whether he is acting advantageously or not, whether
he is committing an act of justice or injustice, generally decides
from pure instinct, occasionally from feeling, but seldom through
clear reasoning, and then always liable to the danger of mistake.
A poem, a melody, a picture, a statue, arises before the mind's eye
something comes to him. Not until something comes
of an artist
:

Creations that are
to him, can he elaborate it further by thought.
works
of art, although
not
artist
are
in
the
born
unconsciously
not
Every
employed.
have
been
manipulation
aesthetic
artifice
of
every
unconsciousness
born
of
science
is
idea
in
powerful
original and
like a stroke of lightning.

We

need but glance at every-day life to become convinced of
how instinctive in its workings the whole mechanism of human exTake the habits and customs of ordinary social life.
istence is.

When

do we ever hear of reasons for acting in this manner or in
that.
We act so because things are not otherwise than they are,
because we must, because others do so. We all know how impossible it is to convince a person who can advance no reasons for his
If there were a possiconduct, that his way of thinking is wrong.
case
of a man, it would
in
the
ble prospect of being able to do this
certainly

more

fail

with a woman, whose springs of

instinctive than man's.

In fact, a

life

are pre-eminently

man who does

not act and
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and despised he
and enthusiasm for any cause.

live instinctively is ridiculed

of inspiration

:
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no longer capable

is

The deposits, therefore, of the unconscious workings
human mind in the customs and conceptions of nations,

of the

are

a

source of incalculable importance to the understanding of the hu-

man

soul; and the history of social activity furnishes an infinitely
more copious material to this end than could be obtained by in-

trospection and observation of the psychical

An important

individual.

of a single

life

human

which for the
consciousness, can thus be

part of our psychical

life,

most part does not directly appear in
gathered from the customs and conceptions of the peoples of the
earth.

Our statements
of the jural sense.
tality of

man.

as to consciousness in general are likewise true

The

jural sense

by no means exhausts the

psychical processes which constitute the jural

More properly, the majority

of these processes

life

come

to-

of a

into

the jural consciousness as results, as feelings and desires, or as instinctive jural

judgments; while the genesis

formations are hidden in unconsciousness.

of

But

these psychical
in the jural insti-

tutions and conceptions of nations a great deal of jural

life

comes

remains unknown to the individual, and so it is possible to penetrate much farther by this method into the cognition of
the human mind in its jural aspects than was possible by the observation of one's own jural sense or by observing the expressions of
to light that

the jural sense of single individuals.

But apart from
nature of

Law

this

itself

broad psychological standpoint, the very

indicates that the

method can lead to nothing, and
method can produce satisfactory

individuo-psychological

that only the socio-psychological
results.

observation that the individual jural sense

It will
is

appear on closer

not the creator of the

on the contrary, that the individual jural sense is a
product of law as a sphere of social life. Only in so far as the jural sense is consciousness per se are we concerned with a biological
basis; in so far, however, as it is a jural consciousness, the founThe human consciousness has a physical
dation is sociological.
basis in the central organs of the body, but we should search in
vain in the human body for an organ that is the seat of the moral

jural order, but

or jural sense.

A human

being, reared in a state of perfect isola-

would think because he possessed a brain and had to use it
But we should find no trace of a
in the struggle with nature.
moral sense or a jural sense in such a person. They are both the

tion,

exclusive product of

life

in

human

society.

They

first arise

through
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adaptation to the social relations in which men live, and not until
this adaptation is perfected does human consciousness acquire,

among innumerable other
of rights

The

notions, conceptions of right

jural order, therefore,

ture of the

human

bodies in which

it

is

not to be explained from the na-

individual, but from the nature of the social

And

has been evolved.

source that the individual jural sense also

Although the
is

and wrong,

and obligations.

jural sense acts purely

is

it

becomes

only from this
intelligible.

from instinct within

us,

it

nevertheless the creation of social and not of individual factors.

This

will

appear from the fact that

it

acts in opposition to individ-

How are we to find one biological basis for the
ual inclination.
two psychical forces that come into conflict when the individual
an inclination to commit a crime and his
And if there be no biological
jural sense restrains him from it ?
theory
that a person can control his
basis, then the psychological
sensuous inclinations by the innate rational faculty rests upon im-

becomes possessed

of

In reality the controlling element here is not a biological or an individuo-psychological factor, it is a socio-psychological
agination.

one.

The most

telling proof that the individual jural sense is not a

found in the circumstance
that, apart from the changes it suffers as consciousness proper
(through age, insanity, etc.), its content is determined by the character of the social community in which the individual lives or has
biological but a sociological product

is

grown up. Were this not the case the jural sense of Frenchmen,
Germans, Russians, and Chinese, who hnd attained the same deBut this
gree of intellectual culture, would be one and the same.
Identity of jural sense means identity of
is obviously not the case.
social organisation.

The individuo-psychological

standpoint, accordingly,

is

inade-

quate for the explanation of the facts of jural life and we must expect really valuable scientific results only from a socio-psychological analysis of jural

The

phenomena.

socio-psychological method proceeds, in

of the causes of jural

the forms which

life,

not from the

Law assumes

human

in society,

its

investigation

individual, but from

from jural customs, jural

conceptions, and jural institutions as they are met with in the life
All these forms arose originally from exof nations themselves.
pressions of the individual jural sense, and these expressions are
in their turn founded upon social instincts developed by life in hu-

^
man
crete

society.

By
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frequent repetition and the elimination of con-

notions, these

character.

expressions gradually lose their individual

They become expressions

of a concrete
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of the corporate jural sense

sphere of social development.

In this

way

a nation

acquires a set of jural customs and jural conceptions, which regulate its acts

and judgments, and whose conservation

is

entrusted to

the government of the social sphere in which they were evolved.
In this so-called positive law, the organic law of a nation assumes

an objective form.

It is

a precipitate, in a social shape, of the

forms of divinity, and doctrinal
human language
of human thought.
In the positive law of a definite epoch lies,
essentially, the normal jural sense of the totality of individuals
embraced within a single sphere of social development, as founded
upon the jural order transmitted from previous generations.
These positive laws constitute the combined data of the sociopsychological investigations of jural life and they are full of promise.
In the evolution of positive laws the creative national genius
has instinctively accomplished a scientific work, such as could only
be obtained by thoroughly analysing the utterances of the jural
sense of all the individuals that now live or ever have lived within
the social sphere governed by the positive law in question.
The study of the individual jural sense is thus in reality unnecessary, and the science of jurisprudence may begin at once
with the analysis of positive laws.
The question now arises as to what method of conducting the
analysis of jural life, as a field of social activity, will be most productive of results.
And this question we shall answer in our sec-

jural sense, just as religious rites,

faith are the precipitates of the religious sense, or

;

ond and concluding

article.

